The COVID-19 pandemic prompted immense work on the investigation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Rapid, accurate, and consistent interpretation of generated data is thereby of fundamental concern. Ontologies––structured, controlled, vocabularies––are designed to support consistency of interpretation, and thereby to prevent the development of data silos. This paper describes how ontologies are serving this purpose in the COVID-19 research domain, by following principles of the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and by reusing existing ontologies such as the Infectious Disease Ontology (...) (IDO) Core, which provides terminological content common to investigations of all infectious diseases. We report here on the development of an IDO extension, the Virus Infectious Disease Ontology (VIDO), a reference ontology covering viral infectious diseases. We motivate term and definition choices, showcase reuse of terms from existing OBO ontologies, illustrate how ontological decisions were motivated by relevant life science research, and connect VIDO to the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO). We next use terms from these ontologies to annotate selections from life science research on SARS-CoV-2, highlighting how ontologies employing a common upper-level vocabulary may be seamlessly interwoven. Finally, we outline future work, including bacteria and fungus infectious disease reference ontologies currently under development, then cite uses of VIDO and CIDO in host-pathogen data analytics, electronic health record annotation, and ontology conflict-resolution projects. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic prompted immense work on the investigation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Ontologies – structured, controlled, vocabularies – are designed to support consistency of interpretation, and thereby to prevent the development of data silos. This paper describes how ontologies are serving this purpose in the virus research domain, following the principles of the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and drawing on the resources of the Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO) Core. We report the development of the Virus Infectious (...) Disease Ontology (VIDO), a reference ontology extending IDO Core covering viral infectious diseases. We examine newly minted terms, showcase ontology term reuse, and illustrate the use of VIDO by annotating selections from recent life science research on SAR-CoV-2, in the interest of supporting machine learning projects. (shrink)

The Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO) is a suite of interoperable ontology modules that aims to provide coverage of all aspects of the infectious disease domain, including biomedical research, clinical care, and public health. IDO Core is designed to be a disease and pathogen neutral ontology, covering just those types of entities and relations that are relevant to infectious diseases generally. IDO Core is then extended by a collection of ontology modules focusing on specific diseases and pathogens. In this paper we (...) present applications of IDO Core within various areas of infectious disease research, together with an overview of all IDO extension ontologies and the methodology on the basis of which they are built. We also survey recent developments involving IDO, including the creation of IDO Virus; the Coronaviruses Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO); and an extension of CIDO focused on COVID-19 (IDO-CovID-19).We also discuss how these ontologies might assist in information-driven efforts to deal with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, to accelerate data discovery in the early stages of future pandemics, and to promote reproducibility of infectious disease research. (shrink)

This is the review of a book by Paula Byrne on Lord Mansfield's great-niece, Dido, whom he raised as his own daughter. Lord Mansfield was the Lord Chief Justice of England in the Eighteenth Century. The child was brought to him as an infant and grew up to become what we would today term his paralegal clerk in his Library at Kenwood House. His great-niece was the child of a black slave and his sister's son, Sir John Lindsay. (...) This is also a narrative of the British Slave trade including some of Lord Mansfield's judgements at the King's Bench Division, Royal Courts of Justice. (shrink)

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO DEPARTAMENTO DE ZOOTECNIA – 50 ANOS EMANUEL ISAQUE CORDEIRO DA SILVA REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL: OVULAÇÃO, CONTROLE E SINCRONIZAÇÃO -/- REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL: OVULAÇÃO, CONTROLE E SINCRONIZAÇÃO DO CICLO ESTRAL -/- ANIMAL REPRODUCTION: OVULATION, CONTROL AND SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ESTRAL CYCLE -/- Autor: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ/CAP-UFPE/EEFCC-BJ/UFRPE 1. INTRODUÇÃO As fêmeas dos animais domésticos possuem em seus ovários, desde praticamente o nascimento, a dotação completa de gametas dos quais vão dispor para o resto de sua (...) vida. No entanto, terão que esperar até a puberdade para que se produza a evolução completa dos folículos (foliculogênese) que darão como resultado as primeiras ovulações. Este momento caracteriza-se, por um lado, pelo início gradual da secreção por parte da hipófise de quantidades importantes de hormonas gonadotropinas (hormonas folículo estimulante «FSH» e sobretudo luteinizante «LH»); por outro lado, pelo aumento da capacidade dos seus ovários para responder a estas secreções. A partir daí, o aparelho reprodutor feminino das fêmeas domésticas deve apresentar, durante todo o período de atividade sexual, alterações morfológicas, endócrinas e fisiológicas, que devem ser repetidas sequencialmente e periodicamente, consoante com a duração e a frequência do ciclo estral característico de cada espécie animal, assegurando assim a liberação de um ou mais ovócitos férteis nos ciclos estrais correspondentes. -/- 2. EVOLUÇÃO DO OVÓCITO E DOS FOLÍCULOS OVÁRICOS O ovário constitui um órgão de armazenamento de ovócitos formados durante a vida fetal ou após o nascimento, os quais permanecerão «latentes», num estado de imaturidade, paralisando a sua atividade de desenvolvimento e crescimento após o processo de mitose pelo qual as células germinativas ou ovogonias evoluem para ovócitos primários. Estes ovócitos devem ser rodeados por células foliculares para alcançar sua maturação e posterior ovulação, constituindo-se, desta maneira, os folículos. Estes últimos, que se localizam no parênquima ovárico, sofrem uma série de mudanças evolutivas que os fazem passar de folículos primordiais (constituídos por um ovócito rodeado de células planas) a folículos maduros ou de Graaf, passando pelos estágios primário, secundário e terciários. A estrutura do ovário e a terminologia correspondente, bem como a sua fisiologia, já foram tratados em trabalhos anteriores. Basicamente, o folículo maduro ou de Graaf, que ressalta já na superfície ovariana como se tratasse de uma pequena vesícula cheia de líquido, encontra-se constituído, no caso dos mamíferos, pelas tecas externa e interna, a folha basal, o ovócito e o seu núcleo ou vesícula germinativa e um acúmulo de células da granulosa chamado cumulus. O antro-folicular ou cavidade intrafolicular formada durante o estágio de folículo terciário possui no seu interior um líquido cuja composição provém do plasma sanguíneo. Por outro lado, o ovócito, que desde a constituição da reserva de folículos primordiais se encontrava em estado de ovócito primário, começa a aumentar de volume (durante a fase de evolução do folículo terciário a folículo maduro) e a cobrir-se de uma membrana celular denominada zona pelúcida. Nos momentos que precedem imediatamente à ovulação reativa-se a meiose, liberando-se o primeiro corpúsculo polar e convertendo-se o ovócito em secundário. Produzida a ovulação retoma-se de novo a meiose, que tinha permanecido em repouso, e depois de ocorrer a fecundação libera-se o segundo corpúsculo polar, passando a ser uma ovotida ou óvulo maduro. -/- 3. A OVULAÇÃO Acabado o crescimento, o folículo maduro ou de Graaf é capaz de responder à descarga pré-ovulatória de gonadotropinas (LH e em menor medida FSH) de tal forma que se produza uma reestruturação completa do mesmo e a subsequente liberação de um ovócito fértil através de um pequeno orifício (estigma) produzido no ponto de ruptura da sua parede celular e das camadas celulares mais superficiais do córtex ovárico, cuja espessura, neste momento, é muito reduzida. No momento da ovulação tanto o líquido folicular como o ovócito são projetados, entre outras causas, pela contração da musculatura lisa que rodeia os folículos para a cavidade peritoneal caindo perto das fimbrias do oviduto ou trompas de Falópio. Esta expulsão, no caso das vacas e ovelhas, ocorre sob a forma de um fluxo fluido, enquanto na coelha ocorre sob a forma de um jato súbito ou de um processo explosivo. No caso da égua, a estrutura dos seus ovários difere das outras fêmeas domésticas, no sentido em que a zona vascular se localiza superficialmente e os folículos se distribuem no interior do ovário. Ao mesmo tempo, a ovulação ocorre unicamente num determinado ponto denominado fossa de ovulação. Por tudo isso, durante a foliculogênese, os folículos vão migrando para a fossa de ovulação, chegando em algumas ocasiões a ficarem presos no interior do ovário, não conseguindo desenvolver-se nem evolucionar (folículo cístico) e que, ao apresentar uma secreção contínua de estrogênios, produz na fêmea um estado de cio permanente ou ninfomania. Nas espécies cuja ovulação é espontânea, o processo supra ocorre periódica e sequencialmente em todos os ciclos estrais com um intervalo conhecido a partir do início do estro ou, no caso da vaca, após o término deste (tabela 1). Por outro lado, nas espécies de ovulação induzida (coelha, gata e fêmeas de furão e camelo) esta ocorre pouco depois de realizado o coito. Nestas espécies, o estímulo coital, favorecido pelas espículas localizadas no pênis do macho, determina por via eferente nervosa a liberação hipotalâmica de GnRH, que em poucos minutos depois provoca a secreção adeno-hepática de LH, que por via sistêmica alcança os folículos, desencadeando os processos fisiológicos que conduzem à ovulação. Tabela 1: Parâmetros que definem o ciclo sexual e tipo de ovulação de algumas espécies domésticas (adaptado e elaborado a partir de DUKES, et. al. 1996). -/- Espécie Duração do ciclo estral Atividade sexual Tipo de ovulação E/I N° de ovócitos Duração do estro Momento da ovulação Vaca 21 dias Poliéstrica contínua E 1 18 horas 11 horas após o final do estro Ovelha 17 dias Poliéstrica estacional E 1-3 29 horas Ao final do estro Porca 21 dias Poliéstrica contínua E 11-24 45 horas 24-36 horas do começo do estro Égua 21 dias Poliéstrica estacional E 1 6 dias 24-48 horas antes do final do cio Cabra 20 dias Poliéstrica estacional E 1-3 40 horas 33 horas do começo do estro Cadela 9 dias Monoéstrica a cada 4-8 E — 7-9 dias 3-4 dias do começo do estro Gata 5 dias Poliéstrica estacional I 3-4 4 dias 27 horas postcoito Coelha 16 dias Poliéstrica I 4-12 Não definida 10 horas postcoito -/- Dado que a vida fértil dos ovócitos, uma vez produzida a ovulação, raramente ultrapassa as 10-12 horas, é importante, sobretudo quando se realiza inseminação artificial ou monta dirigida, determinar, a partir da presença dos sintomas de cio, o período de tempo durante o qual a fertilização numa exploração específica será efetuada, evitando-se assim uma redução da fecundidade. 3.1 Ovulação simples e múltipla Em algumas ocasiões, dependendo da espécie (ver tab. 1), são vários os folículos que apresentam uma evolução completa, chegando a possuir nas células da granulosa receptores de LH, com o qual realiza-se a descarga ovulante de gonadotropinas e produz-se uma ovulação múltipla ou multiovulação, sendo, neste caso, libertados vários ovócitos férteis. No esquema abaixo, observa-se os processos de recrutamento, seleção e dominação da espécie ovina, a partir dos quais um ou vários folículos em crescimento chegam a ovular, bem como a influência das gonadotropinas FSH e LH em cada uma destas fases. Independentemente da influência genética, manifestada pelas diferenças entre espécies, raças e mesmo estirpes, os processos que determinam que entre um grupo de folículos em crescimento sejam um ou vários deles que cheguem a ovular englobam-se sob os termos de recrutamento, seleção e dominação folicular (fig. 1). -/- Figura 1. Recrutamento, seleção e dominação folicular na espécie ovina e influência do FSH e LH nas fases. SILVA, 2019. O recrutamento é definido como a entrada em crescimento terminal de um grupo de folículos gonadodependentes, ou seja, que dentre os folículos em crescimento que existem no reservatório ovariano iniciarão seu crescimento terminal aqueles que possuem receptores à FSH (a partir do estágio primário já os possuem) e tenham igualmente atingido um tamanho determinado, que varia entre as diferentes espécies (2 mm Ø em ovelhas). Geralmente o número de folículos recrutados é duas ou três vezes superior ao número de folículos ovulados. O recrutamento no caso da ovelha ocorre três dias antes da ovulação sob a regressão do corpo lúteo e aumento de FSH. A seleção é caracterizada porque entre os folículos recrutados um ou vários folículos continuam a aumentar de tamanho, enquanto o resto se torna atrésico. No caso da ovelha, o tamanho do folículo no momento da seleção corresponde ao tamanho em que aparecem os receptores de LH sobre a granulosa (folículo terciário) ou quando, como se verá posteriormente, a aromatização de andrógenos em estrogênios é máxima. Por outro lado, a produção de inibina (hormônio gonodal não esteroide) é igualmente elevada. A interação destes dois fatores de retroalimentação (estrogénios e inibina) para a secreção de FSH provoca uma redução dos níveis desta hormona, facilitando a seleção: neste contexto, verificou-se que a injeção de FSH em ovinos bloqueia a seleção produzindo, com efeito, uma multiovulação. No caso da vaca, poderia existir um segundo mecanismo regulador: o folículo maior poderia secretar, em um momento da seleção, um composto de ação parácrina, diminuindo a resposta de outros folículos à ação dos níveis existentes de FSH. A dominância que produz os folículos selecionados está associada com a regressão ou atresia de outros folículos recrutados e com a inibição do recrutamento de novos folículos. Embora os níveis de FSH diminuam, os folículos dominantes persistem porque reduzem suas necessidades em FSH. Esta adaptação a meios mais pobres em FSH poderia explicar-se, entre outras causas, pela ampliação da resposta a esses níveis baixos em FSH graças à produção de IGFI (Insulin Like Growth Factor l), no caso da ovelha, pelo folículo dominante. O IGFI estimula a aromatização dos androgênios em estrogênios e, por sua vez, o estradiol estimula a produção de IGFI nas células granulosas, tornando-a ao mesmo tempo mais sensível ao IGFI. Este laço formado pelo estradiol e IGFI pode desempenhar um papel importante na produção do folículo dominante do estradiol. -/- 4. MECANISMOS NEUROENDÓCRINOS QUE CONDUZEM À OVULAÇÃO A ovulação, propriamente dita, pode ser um bom ponto de partida para explicar os mecanismos neuroendócrinos que se sucedem para alcançar, no próximo ciclo estral, uma nova ovulação. Imediatamente após a ocorrência da ovulação, forma-se um coágulo de sangue no interior do folículo em consequência da hemorragia causada pela ruptura celular (folículo hemorrágico) e que servirá de substrato para o crescimento das células granulosas. Em seguida, as células da granulosa hipertrofiam e proliferam rapidamente, acumulando lipídios e pigmentos carotenoides (luteína) que lhe conferem uma cor amarelada (corpo lúteo). Esta estrutura formada, sob a ação do LH e também da prolactina, começa a produzir progesterona, a qual além de preparar o aparelho reprodutor para uma possível gestação inibe, a nível da hipófise, a secreção cíclica de LH, impedindo assim novas ovulações. À medida que os níveis de progesterona diminuem devido à regressão do corpo lúteo sob a ação da PGF2a (prostaglandina 2a), vários folículos começam seu crescimento sob a ação dos níveis de FSH (cada vez maiores), atingindo o seu crescimento final na fase folicular. Alcançado o estado de terciário, as células da teca interna do folículo, estimuladas pela secreção tônica do LH liberada pela hipófise em pequenas ondas (sem chegar a atingir a quantidade que provoca a ovulação), sintetizam a partir do colesterol, passando por alguns passos intermediários, testosterona, que é depois aromatizada a estradiol sob a ação do FSH pelas células da granulosa (fig. 2). A prolactina, juntamente com o FSH, também influencia o crescimento e a maturação dos folículos, bem como a produção de estrogênios. À medida que avança o crescimento e maturação dos folículos, a concentração de estradiol aumenta (os folículos que em um momento da evolução se tornam atrésicos aportam também uma quantidade importante de estradiol), sendo máxima nos momentos imediatos à ovulação (fig. 3). Este aumento, sustentado na taxa circulante de estrogênios, é a responsável pelo aparecimento do cio nas fêmeas, cujo final, geralmente, exerce um efeito feedback positivo sobre o eixo hipotálamo-hipofisário induzindo o pico pré-ovulatório de LH (e também FSH), que conduz a nova ovulação. Figura 2. Processo de aromatização dos andrógenos em estrógenos. (Adaptado e elaborado a partir de ILLERA, 1994). -/- Figura 3. Crescimento prático folicular, e níveis de progesterona e 17 estradiol (a) e FSH e LH (b), durante o ciclo estral da ovelha. (Elaborado a partir de DURÁN DEL CAMPO, 1980). Nota importante: a ovulação em algumas espécies não é acompanhada do cio (ovulações silentes ou silenciosas), sobretudo nas primeiras ovulações da puberdade e após o anestro estacionário, devido a produção nula da estimulação prévia da progesterona. Embora citado anteriormente que o crescimento folicular começa no final da fase lútea no caso da vaca, a ovelha e a égua, a população de folículos ovulatórios se renova ao longo do ciclo estral, produzindo-se um crescimento e regressão dos folículos, denominado onda folicular. Nestas ondas, que também podem ocorrer durante o período pré-púbere, anestro estacionário e pós-parto, os folículos são receptores à descarga de LH, no entanto, a sua capacidade de produzir estradiol é muito limitada devido a uma deficiência de precursores em tecas ou a uma inadequação da aromatização dos androgênios em estrogênios, com o qual não se atinge a quantidade de estrogênios necessários para produzir a ativação nervosa necessária para a liberação cíclica de LH. Do ponto de vista prático, o conhecimento dos mecanismos neuroendócrinos que se sucedem durante o ciclo estral e que conduzem à ovulação, bem como a sua possível regulação mediante técnicas culturais ou tratamentos hormonais, é de vital importância quando o que se pretende é realizar um controle e sincronização tanto do cio quanto da ovulação. -/- 5. ALTERAÇÕES MORFOLÓGICAS ASSOCIADAS À OVULAÇÃO Nos momentos prévios à ovulação, o folículo ovulatório experimenta uma série de mudanças morfológicas e histológicas regulamentadas endocrinamente e cuja finalidade será a modificação da estrutura do folículo, facilitando a liberação do ovócito fértil. Logo após a descarga pré-ovulatória, ocorre um aumento do fluxo sanguíneo associado a um acúmulo de sangue que dependerá, entre outros, da prostaglandina E2 (PGF2) secretada pelas células granulosas. A teca externa é edemaciada pela difusão do plasma sanguíneo e o volume do antro folicular aumenta pela atração de água exercida pelo ácido hialurônico secretado pelas células do cumulus sob a ação do FSH/LH. Este aumento de volume é facilitado pela dissociação dos feixes de fibras de colágeno da teca externa e da túnica albugínea sob a ação de duas enzimas: a colagenase e a plasmina. A plasmina age em primeiro lugar e aparece como resultado da produção de ativadores do plasminogênio pelas células da granulosa e do cumulus; sua atividade é máxima no ápice do folículo dissociando a matriz proteica dos feixes de fibras de colágeno e ativando o precursor da colagenase. Além disso, a atividade da colagenase é máxima no momento da ruptura do folículo. A maioria das células da granulosa que estão fixadas na lâmina basal se soltam, perdem sua união em colônia e deixam de se dividir (fig. 4). As ligações que as ligavam desaparecem, mas a sua dissociação não é completa devido, provavelmente, à produção local de inibidores da colagenase. As células do cumulus sofrem as mesmas transformações, mas a sua dissociação é total porque estas secretam ácido hialurônico. No entanto, as células que asseguraram, desde o início do crescimento folicular, a ligação entre a granulosa e o ovócito permanecem durante um período mais ou menos longo, ligadas à coroa radiada. Figura 4. Estado de um folículo pouco antes da ovulação. DRIANCOURT, et al. 1991. Pouco antes da ovulação, a lâmina basal desaparece de seu lugar, ocorre uma individualização dos vasos sanguíneos e as células da teca interna penetram no folículo. No ápice do folículo, produz-se uma deficiência na irrigação sanguínea e, portanto, de oxigênio, o que faz com que as células do epitélio ovariano morram. As hidrolases, que nesse momento são liberadas, contribuem para a destruição completa dos tecidos subjacentes. Em definitivo, é o conjunto de fatos comentado supra que conduzem à ruptura do ápice do folículo e provocam um aumento da pressão hidrostática que se traduz em uma contração do folículo expulsando o ovócito e as células da coroa radiada. -/- 6. CONTROLE, SINCRONIZAÇÃO E INDUÇÃO DA OVULAÇÃO 6.1 Introdução O controle e a sincronização da ovulação se situa dentro de um contexto muito mais amplo como é o controle da reprodução, entendendo como tal o governo dos elementos manipuláveis do processo reprodutivo. No âmbito do controle da reprodução, existem muitos objetivos, entre os quais a indução da puberdade, a cobertura em época de anestro, aumento da prolificidade, entre outras. Além disso, o controle da reprodução é necessário para a utilização de determinadas técnicas, como a inseminação artificial ou a transferência de embriões. Com efeito, e consoante com o objetivo pretendido, poderão ser utilizadas diferentes técnicas e métodos, tais como os tratamentos hormonais, o efeito macho, a alimentação (Flushing) e os cruzamentos, tudo isso, por sua vez, empregado nos esquemas de seleção. Neste sentido e como passo prévio à sincronização e indução da ovulação, em muitas ocasiões se realiza também um controle e sincronização do cio. Este último, além de permitir que o criador regule o momento do estro e da cobrição, podendo em algumas espécies suprimir o anestro estacionário, permite que os animais se agrupem em lotes homogêneos e assim poder alimentá-los com as dietas adequadas segundo o estado de gestação, atender os partos e assim diminuir a mortalidade neonatal, programar os desmames e engordar os animais para, por fim, vender os animais por lotes. Na sincronização do cio o que se pretende é atuar sobre o intervalo entre a fase folicular e a fase luteica, modificando, portanto, a duração do ciclo estral (fig. 5). Figura 5. Representação dos métodos de sincronização do ciclo estral: (a) duração normal das fases luteica e folicular: (b) fase luteica cortada: (c) extensão da fase luteica. HUNTER, 1987. Para alcançar esse objetivo, os criadores podem adotar dois métodos: a) Induzindo a regressão do corpo lúteo de um grupo de animais de forma que todos eles iniciem a fase folicular e apresentem o cio num espaço de tempo bastante semelhante (injeções de prostaglandinas) (fig. 5b). b) Alargando artificialmente, através de um bloqueio hormonal, a fase luteica de tal modo que, ao cessar esse bloqueio e injetar-lhes gonadotropinas exógenas, os animais iniciem conjuntamente uma fase folicular seguida de um cio sincronizado (injeções de progesterona, implantes de progesterona ou progestágenos, esponjas vaginais impregnadas de progestágenos) (fig. 5c). 6.2 Objetivos e fundamentos Os tratamentos de controle e sincronização da ovulação têm por objetivo tentar regular, por um lado, o momento exato da ovulação, e por outro, o número de folículos que possam chegar a liberar ovócitos férteis, ao qual pode-se conseguir mediante a intervenção nos processos de recrutamento e seleção dos folículos. O primeiro objetivo permitirá que se realize a inseminação artificial no momento propício, evitando o envelhecimento dos ovócitos e que se possa calcular o momento da fertilização e a fase de desenvolvimento dos embriões (realização de transplantes). Por outro lado, o segundo objetivo ajudará a aumentar a fertilidade e a prolificidade em um rebanho e, no caso de fêmeas doadoras para a transferência de embriões, a relação: número de embriões/fêmea doadora. A indução da ovulação e/ou o aumento da taxa de ovulação pode ser conseguida aumentando os níveis de gonadotropinas no sangue antes do início da atresia folicular, ou seja, 3 a 5 dias antes da ovulação. Por outro lado, a taxa de ovulação pode também ser aumentada através da imunização contra esteroides, embora, por outro lado, permitam uma sincronização de cios. Além disso, o aumento dos níveis de gonadotropinas pode ser conseguido estimulando a sua secreção pelo próprio organismo do animal, por injeção de fatores de liberação hipotalâmicos que estimulem na hipófise a secreção de gonadotropinas, através do manejo dos reprodutores (efeito macho) e da alimentação (Flushing) ou por injeção das gonadotropinas no animal. 6.3 Imunização contra esteroides A imunização contra esteroides é uma técnica eficaz para aumentar a taxa de ovulação de animais que encontram-se em atividade sexual, ou seja, fora do anestro, uma vez que o seu mecanismo de ação baseia-se na alteração do controle endócrino da ovulação devido à ação dos anticorpos contra os esteroides ováricos, especialmente contra a androstenediona. Esta última regula a produção de uma proteína denominada «interleucina l», secretada pelos macrófagos do sistema imunitário e que inibe a diferenciação dos receptores à LH nos folículos, sem afetar a quantidade de sangue do FSH. Por isso, a teoria que tenta explicar o mecanismo de ação dos tratamentos de imunização é a seguinte: «O bloqueio dos esteroides pelos anticorpos do tratamento reduziria a produção de «interleucina l», permitindo assim que um maior número de folículos tivessem receptores à LH e pudessem ovular». Existem dois tipos de imunização: imunização ativa e imunização passiva. Na primeira, a metodologia consiste em tratar o animal com uma série de vacinas por via subcutânea ou intradérmica, pelo menos em duas ocasiões, até que a resposta imunitária atinja o nível desejado e ele próprio produza os anticorpos contra o antígeno (androstenediona) contido no conteúdo da vacina. Por outro lado, na imunização passiva o animal tratado recebe soro, por via intravenosa, de outro animal que foi imunizado (anticorpos policlonais), ou anticorpos monoclonais produzidos mediante técnicas imunológicas modernas. 6.4. Injeções de hormonas gonadotropinas As preparações hormonais de gonadotropinas injetadas num momento adequado do ciclo estral permitem, por um lado, aumentar o número de folículos em desenvolvimento (preparações ricas em atividade FSH) e, por outro lado, controlar e sincronizar o momento da ovulação (preparações ricas em atividade LH). Atualmente, os preparados hormonais à base de LH e FSH puros obtidos a partir de glândulas pituitárias em matadouros deixaram de ser utilizados, já que, além de não serem economicamente rentáveis, a sua conservação e utilização acarreta inúmeros problemas. a) A PMSG ou gonadotropina do soro de égua gestante com atividade predominante em FSH. Este hormônio, que permite aumentar o número de folículos em desenvolvimento, deve ser injetado (em doses variáveis segundo a espécie; tabela 2) no início da fase folicular, imediatamente após a regressão do corpo lúteo, quando as gonadotropinas endógenas do próprio animal estimulam o crescimento folicular. Para determinar esse exato momento, normalmente se realiza uma sincronização do cio. Tabela 2. Doses de aplicação do PMSG e do HCG (em unidades internacionais SI) para regular a quantidade e o momento da ovulação Espécie PMSG HCG Vaca 2000 - 3000 500 - 2500 Ovelha 500 - 800 250 - 500 Porca 750 - 1500 500 - 1000 Adaptado e elaborado a partir de HUNTER, 1987. b) A HCG ou gonadotropina coriónica humana com atividade predominante em LH. Pode ser obtida facilmente, já que se acumula na urina da mulher gestante, servindo sua detecção como teste para a determinação da gestação (teste da rã: origina a ejaculação na rã macho). Uma vez que com esta hormona se pretende controlar o momento da ovulação, a injeção deve ser feita por via intravenosa ou intramuscular, algumas horas antes do animal ter iniciado o estro e portanto a liberação das hormonas gonadotropinas. Pode-se conseguir mediante a injeção, com um intervalo conhecido e em doses adequadas (2), após estimulação com PMSG ou após sincronização do estro. 6.5 Limites das técnicas de controle, sincronização e indução à ovulação Os objetivos almejados durante o tratamento de sincronização e indução da ovulação, acima mencionados, não chegaram a ser alcançados em sua totalidade devido, principalmente, aos seguintes fatores: a) O hipotálamo mediante a liberação em forma de ondas ou pulsações cada um ou dois minutos de fatores liberadores (GnRH) estimula a hipófise para a secreção de hormônios gonadotropinas, o que na prática é muito difícil de se artificializar. b) Como resultado das injeções de hormonas gonadotropas produz-se um feedback dos esteroides gonodais, o qual interfere na secreção de hormonas endógenas e na precisão da resposta. c) As preparações hormonais de natureza proteica provocam a formação de anticorpos no animal, pelo qual a relação dose-resposta não é exata. d) Uma vez que os níveis de resposta tenham sido atingidos, a administração de doses excessivas de gonadotropinas produz uma redução do número de ovulações e interfere nos mecanismos ovulatórios. -/- 7. RESUMO E PRIMEIRAS CONCLUSÕES A ovulação marca o culminar de uma série de alterações morfológicas, fisiológicas e endócrinas que se sucedem no aparelho reprodutor feminino e mais concretamente no ovário e nos folículos ováricos e cujo objetivo é a liberação, após a descarga ovulante de LH, de um ou mais ovócitos férteis, de acordo com as espécies. Da mesma forma, a ovulação se caracteriza pela retomada da meiose e a liberação do primeiro corpúsculo polar, bem como a iniciação da luteinização das células da granulosa e a reestruturação da parede do folículo. Isto ocorre tanto em espécies de ovulação espontânea como induzida. Todas estas alterações são condicionadas pela variação da concentração sanguínea das hormonas gonadotropinas devido ao feedback positivo ou negativo que os esteroides ováricos exercem sobre o hipotálamo em cada uma das fases do ciclo estral. Por este motivo, se num momento preciso do ciclo estral estimula-se a secreção, por parte da hipófise, de hormonas gonadotropinas mediante a injeção de fatores de liberação hipotalâmicos (GnRH) ou a aplicação de algumas técnicas de manejo (efeito macho e Flushing) ou mediante a incrementação da sua concentração no sangue através de injeções de preparações hormonais, será obtido um controle, sincronização e indução da ovulação. Os diferentes tratamentos de sincronização e indução da ovulação, embora apresentem algumas limitações, permitem regular o momento da ovulação e o número de folículos que chegarão a ovular, alcançando em alguns casos uma superovulação, objetivo pretendido na técnica de transplante de embriões. -/- 8. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- BARUSELLI, Pietro Sampaio; GIMENES, Lindsay Unno; SALES, José Nélio de Sousa. Fisiologia reprodutiva de fêmeas taurinas e zebuínas. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 31, n. 2, p. 205-211, 2007. -/- BINELLI, Mario; IBIAPINA, Bruna Trentinaro; BISINOTTO, Rafael Siscôneto. Bases fisiológicas, farmacológicas e endócrinas dos tratamentos de sincronização do crescimento folicular e da ovulação. Acta Scientiae Veterinariae, v. 34, n. Supl 1, p. 1-7, 2006.p -/- BRACKETT, B. G.; JÚNIOR, G. E. A.; SEIDEL, S. M. Avances en zootecnia. Nuevas técnicas de reproducción animal. 1ª ed. Zaragoza: Editorial Acribia, 1988. -/- COLE, H. H.; CUPPS, P. T. Reproduction in domestic animals. 1ª ed. Londres: Academic Press, 1977. -/- CORTEZ, A. A.; TONIOLLI, R. Aspectos fisiológicos e hormonais da foliculogênese e ovulação em suínos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 36, p. 163-173, 2012. -/- CUNNINGHAM, James. Tratado de fisiologia veterinária. Elsevier Health Sciences, 2011. -/- DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Características Gerais dos Bovinos/General Characteristics of Cattle Bovine. Disponível em: philpeople. Acesso em: Fevereiro de 2020. -/- DERUSSI, A. A. P.; LOPES, M. D. Fisiologia da ovulação, da fertilização e do desenvolvimento embrionário inicial na cadela. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 33, n. 4, p. 231-237, 2009. -/- DRIANCOURT, M. A. et al. The ovarian function. Paris: INRA, 1991. -/- DUKES, Henry Hugh; SWENSON, Melvin J.; REECE, William O. Dukes fisiologia dos animais domésticos. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 1996. -/- DURÁN DEL CAMPO, A. Anatomia, fisiologia de la reproduccion e inseminación artificial en ovinos. Montevideo, Editorial Hemisferio Sur, 1980. 245p. -/- HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. -/- HUNTER, R. H. F. Reproducción de los animales de granja. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1987. -/- ILLERA, M. Endocrinología Veterinaria y Fisiología de la Reproducción. Zaragoza: Fareso, 1994. -/- MARTIN, Ian; FERREIRA, João Carlos Pinheiro. Fisiologia da ovulação e da formação do corpo lúteo bovino. Veterinária e Zootecnia, v. 16, n. 2, p. 270-279, 2009. -/- RASWEILER IV, John J.; BADWAIK, Nilima K. Anatomy and physiology of the female reproductive tract. In: Reproductive biology of bats. Academic Press, 2000. p. 157-219. (shrink)

One of the most noticeable trends in recent years has been the increasing reliance of public decision-making processes on algorithms, i.e. computer-programmed step-by-step instructions for taking a given set of inputs and producing an output. The question raised by this article is whether the rise of such algorithmic governance creates problems for the moral or political legitimacy of our public decision-making processes. Ignoring common concerns with data protection and privacy, it is argued that algorithmic governance does pose a significant threat (...) to the legitimacy of such processes. Modelling my argument on Estlund’s threat of epistocracy, I call this the ‘threat of algocracy’. The article clarifies the nature of this threat and addresses two possible solutions. It is argued that neither solution is likely to be successful, at least not without risking many other things we value about social decision-making. The result is a somewhat pessimistic conclusion in which we confront the possibility that we are creating decision-making processes that constrain and limit opportunities for human participation. (shrink)

Drawing on recent scholarship and delving systematically into Iamblichean texts, these ten papers establish Iamblichus as the great innovator of Neoplatonic philosophy who broadened its appeal for future generations of philosophers.

We are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In doing so, many highlight potential liability gaps that might arise through robot misbehaviour. Although these gaps are interesting and socially significant, they do not exhaust the possible gaps that might be created by increased robotisation. In this article, I make the case for one of those alternative gaps: the retribution gap. This gap arises (...) from a mismatch between the human desire for retribution and the absence of appropriate subjects of retributive blame. I argue for the potential existence of this gap in an era of increased robotisation; suggest that it is much harder to plug this gap than it is to plug those thus far explored in the literature; and then highlight three important social implications of this gap. (shrink)

Most traditional epistemologists see trust and knowledge as deeply antithetical: we cannot know by trusting in the opinions of others; knowledge must be based on evidence, not mere trust. I argue that this is badly mistaken. Modern knowers cannot be independent and self-reliant. In most disciplines, those who do not trust cannot know. Trust is thus often more epistemically basic than empirical evidence or logical argument, for the evidence and the argument are available only through trust. Finally, since the reliability (...) of testimonial evidence depends on the trustworthiness of the testifier, this implies that knowledge often rests on a foundation of ethics. The rationality of many of our beliefs depends not only on our own character, but on the character of others. (shrink)

Suppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. The first is one of distributive justice: how will the efficiency gains from automated labour be distributed through society? The second is one of personal fulfillment and meaning: if people no longer have to work, what will they do with their lives? In this article, I set aside the first issue and focus on (...) the second. In doing so, I make three arguments. First, I argue that there are good reasons to embrace non-work and that these reasons become more compelling in an era of technological unemployment. Second, I argue that the technological advances that make widespread technological unemployment possible could still threaten or undermine human flourishing and meaning, especially if they do not remain confined to the economic sphere. And third, I argue that this threat could be contained if we adopt an integrative approach to our relationship with technology. In advancing these arguments, I draw on three distinct literatures: the literature on technological unemployment and workplace automation; the antiwork critique—which I argue gives reasons to embrace technological unemployment; and the philosophical debate about the conditions for meaning in life—which I argue gives reasons for concern. (shrink)

Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The argument (...) consists of two premises. The first claims that it can be a proper object of the criminal law to regulate wrongful conduct with no extrinsically harmful effects on others. The second claims that the use of robots that replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse would be wrongful, even if such usage had no extrinsically harmful effects on others. I defend both premises of this argument and consider its implications for the criminal law. I do not offer a conclusive argument for criminalisation, nor would I wish to be interpreted as doing so; instead, I offer a tentative argument and a framework for future debate. This framework may also lead one to question the proposed rationales for criminalisation. (shrink)

Many philosophers favour the simple knowledge account of assertion, which says you may assert something only if you know it. The simple account is true but importantly incomplete. I defend a more informative thesis, namely, that you may assert something only if your assertion expresses knowledge. I call this 'the express knowledge account of assertion', which I argue better handles a wider range of cases while at the same time explaining the simple knowledge account's appeal. §1 introduces some new data (...) that a knowledge account of assertion well explains. §2 explains the simple knowledge account's advantage over two of its main competitors. §3 presents a problem for the simple account and offers a solution, which is to adopt the express knowledge account. §4 encapsulates the case for the express knowledge account, and offers a unifying vision for the epistemology of belief and assertion. §5 answers an objection. §6 briefly sums up. Even those who ultimately reject my conclusion can still benefit from the new data presented in §1, and learn an important lesson from the problem discussed in §3, which demonstrates a general constraint on an acceptable account of the norm of assertion. (shrink)

There is a concern that the widespread deployment of autonomous machines will open up a number of ‘responsibility gaps’ throughout society. Various articulations of such techno-responsibility gaps have been proposed over the years, along with several potential solutions. Most of these solutions focus on ‘plugging’ or ‘dissolving’ the gaps. This paper offers an alternative perspective. It argues that techno-responsibility gaps are, sometimes, to be welcomed and that one of the advantages of autonomous machines is that they enable us to embrace (...) certain kinds of responsibility gap. The argument is based on the idea that human morality is often tragic. We frequently confront situations in which competing moral considerations pull in different directions and it is impossible to perfectly balance these considerations. This heightens the burden of responsibility associated with our choices. We cope with the tragedy of moral choice in different ways. Sometimes we delude ourselves into thinking the choices we make were not tragic ; sometimes we delegate the tragic choice to others ; sometimes we make the choice ourselves and bear the psychological consequences. Each of these strategies has its benefits and costs. One potential advantage of autonomous machines is that they enable a reduced cost form of delegation. However, we only gain the advantage of this reduced cost if we accept that some techno-responsibility gaps are virtuous. (shrink)

Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the flaw helps us better (...) understand the nature of knowledge and epistemic justification. I propose a crucial improvement to the traditional view, relying on an intuitive and independently plausible metaphysical distinction pertaining to the manifestation of intellectual powers, which supplements the traditional components of justification, truth and belief. (shrink)

Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. In particular, as automating technologies develop enhanced competency they seem to threaten the values associated with meaningful work. In this article, we focus on one such value: the value of achievement. We argue that achievement is a key part of what makes work meaningful and that advances in AI and automation give rise to a number achievement gaps in the workplace. This could limit people’s ability (...) to participate in meaningful forms of work. Achievement gaps are interesting, in part, because they are the inverse of the (negative) responsibility gaps already widely discussed in the literature on AI ethics. Having described and explained the problem of achievement gaps, the article concludes by identifying four possible policy responses to the problem. (shrink)

In previous articles, it has been shown that the deductive system developed by Aristotle in his "second logic" is a natural deduction system and not an axiomatic system as previously had been thought. It was also stated that Aristotle's logic is self-sufficient in two senses: First, that it presupposed no other logical concepts, not even those of propositional logic; second, that it is (strongly) complete in the sense that every valid argument expressible in the language of the system is deducible (...) by means of a formal deduction in the system. Review of the system makes the first point obvious. The purpose of the present article is to prove the second. Strong completeness is demonstrated for the Aristotelian system. (shrink)

As he moves closer to half of his term as president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Roa Duterte has continually been in friction with the Catholic Church, specifically with certain members of its hierarchy. Mainly identifiable as the dividing line between Duterte’s administration and the Church is the issue on human rights particularly the extrajudicial killings (EJK) of suspected users and pushers of illegal drugs. This paper argues that Duterte’s attitude and positioning towards the Catholic Church neither strengthen nor advance the (...) Philippine state towards a greater degree of secularization. On the contrary, the Church has become more politically and publicly involved. Consequently, it has remained a key actor or interest group providing an alternative moral discourse to that of the government. (shrink)

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two (...) factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology. (shrink)

After a short preface, the first of the three sections of this paper is devoted to historical and philosophic aspects of categoricity. The second section is a self-contained exposition, including detailed definitions, of a proof that every mathematical system whose domain is the closure of its set of distinguished individuals under its distinguished functions is categorically characterized by its induction principle together with its true atoms (atomic sentences and negations of atomic sentences). The third section deals with applications especially those (...) involving the distinction between characterizing a system and axiomatizing the truths of a system. (shrink)

Jennifer Nagel (2010) has recently proposed a fascinating account of the decreased tendency to attribute knowledge in conversational contexts in which unrealized possibilities of error have been mentioned. Her account appeals to epistemic egocentrism, or what is sometimes called the curse of knowledge, an egocentric bias to attribute our own mental states to other people (and sometimes our own future and past selves). Our aim in this paper is to investigate the empirical merits of Nagel’s hypothesis about the psychology involved (...) in knowledge attribution. (shrink)

This paper argues that the role of knowledge in the explanation and production of intentional action is as indispensable as the roles of belief and desire. If we are interested in explaining intentional actions rather than intentions or attempts, we need to make reference to more than the agent’s beliefs and desires. It is easy to see how the truth of your beliefs, or perhaps, facts about a setting will be involved in the explanation of an action. If you believe (...) you can stop your car by pressing a pedal, then, if your belief is true, you will stop. If it is false, you will not. By considering cases of unintentional actions, actions involving luck and cases of deviant causal chains, I show why knowledge is required. By looking at the notion of causal relevance, I argue that the connection between knowledge and action is causal and not merely conceptual. (shrink)

The foundations of research ethics are riven with fault lines emanating from a fear that if research is too closely connected to weighty social purposes an imperative to advance the common good through research will justify abrogating the rights and welfare of study participants. The result is an impoverished conception of the nature of research, an incomplete focus on actors who bear important moral responsibilities, and a system of ethics and oversight highly attuned to the dangers of research but largely (...) silent about threats of ineffective, inefficient, and inequitable medical practices and health systems. -/- In For the Common Good: Philosophical Foundations of Research Ethics, Alex John London defends a conception of the common good that grounds a moral imperative with two requirements. The first is to promote research that generates the information necessary to enable key social institutions to effectively, efficiently, and equitably safeguard the basic interests of individuals. The second is to ensure that research is organized as a voluntary scheme of social cooperation that respects its various contributors' moral claims to be treated as free and equal. Connecting research to the goals of a just social order grounds a framework for assessing and managing research risk that reconciles these requirements and justifies key oversight practices in non-paternalistic terms. Reconceiving research ethics as resolving coordination problems and providing credible assurance that these requirements are being met expands the issues and actors that fall within the purview of the field and provides the foundation for a more unified and coherent approach to domestic and international research. -/- This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. (shrink)

This book treats ancient logic: the logic that originated in Greece by Aristotle and the Stoics, mainly in the hundred year period beginning about 350 BCE. Ancient logic was never completely ignored by modern logic from its Boolean origin in the middle 1800s: it was prominent in Boole’s writings and it was mentioned by Frege and by Hilbert. Nevertheless, the first century of mathematical logic did not take it seriously enough to study the ancient logic texts. A renaissance in ancient (...) logic studies occurred in the early 1950s with the publication of the landmark Aristotle’s Syllogistic by Jan Łukasiewicz, Oxford UP 1951, 2nd ed. 1957. Despite its title, it treats the logic of the Stoics as well as that of Aristotle. Łukasiewicz was a distinguished mathematical logician. He had created many-valued logic and the parenthesis-free prefix notation known as Polish notation. He co-authored with Alfred Tarski’s an important paper on metatheory of propositional logic and he was one of Tarski’s the three main teachers at the University of Warsaw. Łukasiewicz’s stature was just short of that of the giants: Aristotle, Boole, Frege, Tarski and Gödel. No mathematical logician of his caliber had ever before quoted the actual teachings of ancient logicians. -/- Not only did Łukasiewicz inject fresh hypotheses, new concepts, and imaginative modern perspectives into the field, his enormous prestige and that of the Warsaw School of Logic reflected on the whole field of ancient logic studies. Suddenly, this previously somewhat dormant and obscure field became active and gained in respectability and importance in the eyes of logicians, mathematicians, linguists, analytic philosophers, and historians. Next to Aristotle himself and perhaps the Stoic logician Chrysippus, Łukasiewicz is the most prominent figure in ancient logic studies. A huge literature traces its origins to Łukasiewicz. -/- This Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, is based on the 1973 Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, the first conference devoted entirely to critical assessment of the state of ancient logic studies. (shrink)

[Edited from Conclusion section:] We have looked at various challenging issues to do with getting connectionism to cope with high-level cognitive activities such a reasoning and natural language understanding. The issues are to do with various facets of generalization that are not commonly noted. We have been concerned in particular with the special forms these issues take in the arena of propositional attitude processing. The main problems we have looked at are: (1) The need to construct explicit representations of generalizations, (...) not just generalize correctly to individual cases; (2) The need to be able to match two or more complex short-term information structures, to enable rapid generalization from recent examples rather than from long-term memories; (3) The need to represent and reason with anomalous combinations of concepts; (4) The need to perform embedded reasoning. This presents special problems for systems using non-concatenative representations (as in mainstream connectionist approaches). We also touched on vague quantification in attitude report complements. Neither this topic nor that of analogies between short-term structures (point 2) has been adequately addressed in the symbolic framework, let alone in connectionism. -/- The opportunities and problems covered are put forward as things worth being optimistic about or pessimistic about, respectively. They are not put forward as decisive arguments for or against connectionism. The hope is that this chapter contributes to a greater understanding of the connectionist/symbolist gap by presenting some unusual issues and by throwing new light on some well known ones. (shrink)

Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet the phenomenology of those states has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for the hypothesis that vision is cognitively impenetrable, the ability of visual processes to ground perceptual warrant and justification, and the distinction between cognitive and perceptual phenomenology. I explore those consequences by describing two forms of visual ambiguity that involve visualizing: the ability to visually experience a picture surface as (...) flat after it has caused volumetric nonconceptual contents, and the ability to use a surface initially perceived as flat to visualize three-dimensional scenes. In both cases, the visual processes which extract viewer-centered volumetric shapes have to rely solely on monocular depth cues in the absence of parallax and stereopsis. Those processes can be cognitively penetrated by acts of visualizing, including ones that draw on conceptual information about kinds. However, the penetrability of the visual processes does not weaken their ability to provide perceptual warrant and justification for beliefs. The reason is that picture perceptions—whether they are stimulus -driven or based on acts of visualizing—are different to object perceptions both phenomenologically and in terms of their functional roles as states. Thus, although the penetrability of the visual processes does mean that subjects can have visual experiences with contradictory contents, perceptual belief is adopted at most towards one set of contents, and questions of warrant and justification are raised only for those contents. A rule-proving exception is provided by trompe-l’oeils. (shrink)

According to several authors, the enhancement project incorporates a quest for hyperagency - i.e. a state of affairs in which virtually every constitutive aspect of agency (beliefs, desires, moods, dispositions and so forth) is subject to our control and manipulation. This quest, it is claimed, undermines the conditions for a meaningful and worthwhile life. Thus, the enhancement project ought to be forestalled or rejected. How credible is this objection? In this article, I argue: “not very”. I do so by evaluating (...) four different versions of the “hyperagency” objection from four different authors. In each case I argue that the objection either fails outright or, at best, provides weak and defeasible grounds for avoiding enhancement. In addition to this, I argue that there are plausible grounds for thinking that enhancement helps, rather than hinders, us in living the good life. (shrink)

Most properties have comparatives, which are relations. For instance, the property of width has the comparative relation denoted by `_ is wider than _'. Let us say a property is reducible to its comparative if any statement that refers to the property has the same meaning as another statement that refers to the comparative instead. Width is not reducible to its comparative. To be sure, many statements that refer to width are reducible: for instance, `The Mississippi is wide' means the (...) same as `The Mississippi is wider than most rivers'. But some statements that refer to width are not reducible: for instance, `Electrons have zero width' is not. A property is not reducible to its comparative if it has absolute degrees, and specifically an absolute zero. A property's comparative relation places things in an order from those that have the property least to those that have it most. If there is an absolute zero point somewhere in this ordering, the property is not reducible to its comparative. For width, there is an absolute zero at one end of the ordering, so width is not reducible. The property of goodness is reducible to its comparative, betterness. In particular, there is no absolute zero of goodness. Things are ordered by betterness – some things are better than others – but nothing is absolutely good or absolutely bad. This is an exaggeration. In certain applications, goodness does have absolute degrees of a sort, and an absolute zero. For instance, it makes sense to say an event is good, and another event bad. These are absolute degrees of a sort, but they are themselves reducible to betterness. To say an event is good simply means the event is better than what would otherwise have happened. The goodness of lives has a different sort of absolute zero. Lives are ordered by betterness; some lives are better than others. We can make sense of the question `Where in this ordering is the division between lives that are good and those that are bad?' The division between good and bad lives is again reducible to betterness. To say a person's life is good means it is better that the person should continue living, rather than that she should die. Or it may mean it is better that her life should be lived rather than that it should never have been lived at all. As it is often put: a good life is a life worth living. Derek Parfit appears to attach a different sense to the idea of a good life. He appears to mean a life that contains a preponderance of good things (such as pleasure) over bad things (such as pain). If a life contains no good things and no bad things, it has zero goodness in this sense. In this sense, absolute goodness and the absolute zero of goodness are not reducible to betterness. However, this is a naturalistic sense of goodness, and it is subject to the open-question objection. If a life contains no good things and no bad things, it is an open question whether it has zero goodness. It might, for instance, be a bad thing that this life should be lived. In discussing the evil of death, some philosophers seem to have been searching for an absolute goodness that is not reducible to betterness. Thomas Nagel speaks of an asymmetry between what is good about life and what is bad about death. But if a person's life is good, that only means it would be better that she should continue living than that she should die. And if a person's death would be bad, that only means it would be worse that she should die than that she should continue living. So there can be no asymmetry. (shrink)

The syllogistic figures and moods can be taken to be argument schemata as can the rules of the Stoic propositional logic. Sentence schemata have been used in axiomatizations of logic only since the landmark 1927 von Neumann paper [31]. Modern philosophers know the role of schemata in explications of the semantic conception of truth through Tarski’s 1933 Convention T [42]. Mathematical logicians recognize the role of schemata in first-order number theory where Peano’s second-order Induction Axiom is approximated by Herbrand’s Induction-Axiom (...) Schema [23]. Similarly, in first-order set theory, Zermelo’s second-order Separation Axiom is approximated by Fraenkel’s first-order Separation Schema [17]. In some of several closely related senses, a schema is a complex system having multiple components one of which is a template-text or scheme-template, a syntactic string composed of one or more “blanks” and also possibly significant words and/or symbols. In accordance with a side condition the template-text of a schema is used as a “template” to specify a multitude, often infinite, of linguistic expressions such as phrases, sentences, or argument-texts, called instances of the schema. The side condition is a second component. The collection of instances may but need not be regarded as a third component. The instances are almost always considered to come from a previously identified language (whether formal or natural), which is often considered to be another component. This article reviews the often-conflicting uses of the expressions ‘schema’ and ‘scheme’ in the literature of logic. It discusses the different definitions presupposed by those uses. And it examines the ontological and epistemic presuppositions circumvented or mooted by the use of schemata, as well as the ontological and epistemic presuppositions engendered by their use. In short, this paper is an introduction to the history and philosophy of schemata. (shrink)

This paper seeks to answer the question: Can contemporary forms of artificial intelligence be creative? To answer this question, I consider three conditions that are commonly taken to be necessary for creativity. These are novelty, value, and agency. I argue that while contemporary AI models may have a claim to novelty and value, they cannot satisfy the kind of agency condition required for creativity. From this discussion, a new condition for creativity emerges. Creativity requires curiosity, a motivation to pursue epistemic (...) goods. I argue that contemporary AI models do not satisfy this new condition. Because they lack both agency and curiosity, it is a mistake to attribute the same sort of creativity to AI that we prize in humans. Finally, I consider the question of whether these AI models stand to make human creativity in the arts and sciences obsolete, despite not being creative themselves. I argue, optimistically, that this is unlikely. (shrink)

Robust technological enhancement of core cognitive capacities is now a realistic possibility. From the perspective of neutralism, the view that justifications for public policy should be neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good, only members of a subset of the ethical concerns serve as legitimate justifications for public policy regarding robust technological enhancement. This paper provides a framework for the legitimate use of ethical concerns in justifying public policy decisions regarding these enhancement technologies by evaluating the ethical concerns that arise (...) in the context of testing such technologies on nonhuman animals. Traditional issues in bioethics, as well as novel concerns such as the possibility of moral status enhancement, are evaluated from the perspective of neutralism. (shrink)

I argue for an account of creativity that unifies creative achievements in the arts, sciences, and other domains and identifies its characteristic value. This account draws upon case studies of creative work in both the arts and sciences to identify creativity as a kind of successful exploration. I argue that if creativity is properly understood in this way, then it is fundamentally a property of processes, something only agents can achieve, something that comes in degrees, subjectively novel, and non-formulaic. As (...) I develop the account, I show how it avoids challenges faced by other accounts of creativity, especially concerning creativity’s value. Hills and Bird (2018, 2019) have together argued that creativity is not necessarily valuable. My account challenges this view. If I am right that creativity is a kind of successful exploration, then creativity does have a characteristic value, specifically epistemic value. (shrink)

Technology could be used to improve morality but it could do so in different ways. Some technologies could augment and enhance moral behaviour externally by using external cues and signals to push and pull us towards morally appropriate behaviours. Other technologies could enhance moral behaviour internally by directly altering the way in which the brain captures and processes morally salient information or initiates moral action. The question is whether there is any reason to prefer one method over the other? In (...) this article, I argue that there is. Specifically, I argue that internal moral enhancement is likely to be preferable to external moral enhancement, when it comes to the legitimacy of political decision-making processes. In fact, I go further than this and argue that the increasingly dominant forms of external moral enhancement may already be posing a significant threat to political legitimacy, one that we should try to address. Consequently, research and development of internal moral enhancements should be prioritised as a political project. (shrink)

The evolution of life on Earth has produced an organism that is beginning to model and understand its own evolution and the possible future evolution of life in the universe. These models and associated evidence show that evolution on Earth has a trajectory. The scale over which living processes are organized cooperatively has increased progressively, as has its evolvability. Recent theoretical advances raise the possibility that this trajectory is itself part of a wider developmental process. According to these theories, the (...) developmental process has been shaped by a yet larger evolutionary dynamic that involves the reproduction of universes. This evolutionary dynamic has tuned the key parameters of the universe to increase the likelihood that life will emerge and produce outcomes that are successful in the larger process (e.g. a key outcome may be to produce life and intelligence that intentionally reproduces the universe and tunes the parameters of ‘offspring’ universes). Theory suggests that when life emerges on a planet, it moves along this trajectory of its own accord. However, at a particular point evolution will continue to advance only if organisms emerge that decide to advance the developmental process intentionally. The organisms must be prepared to make this commitment even though the ultimate nature and destination of the process is uncertain, and may forever remain unknown. Organisms that complete this transition to intentional evolution will drive the further development of life and intelligence in the universe. Humanity’s increasing understanding of the evolution of life in the universe is rapidly bringing it to the threshold of this major evolutionary transition. (shrink)

The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has (...) important implications for turing machine functionalism and the prospect of ‘conscious’ machines. In the paper, instead of seeking to develop Putnam’s claim that, “everything implements every finite state automata”, I will try to establish the weaker result that, “everything implements the specific machine Q on a particular input set ( x )”. Then, equating Q ( x ) to any putative AI program, I will show that conceding the ‘strong AI’ thesis for Q (crediting it with mental states and consciousness) opens the door to a vicious form of panpsychism whereby all open systems, (e.g. grass, rocks etc.), must instantiate conscious experience and hence that disembodied minds lurk everywhere. (shrink)

An advanced artificial intelligence could pose a significant existential risk to humanity. Several research institutes have been set-up to address those risks. And there is an increasing number of academic publications analysing and evaluating their seriousness. Nick Bostrom’s superintelligence: paths, dangers, strategies represents the apotheosis of this trend. In this article, I argue that in defending the credibility of AI risk, Bostrom makes an epistemic move that is analogous to one made by so-called sceptical theists in the debate about the (...) existence of God. And while this analogy is interesting in its own right, what is more interesting are its potential implications. It has been repeatedly argued that sceptical theism has devastating effects on our beliefs and practices. Could it be that AI-doomsaying has similar effects? I argue that it could. Specifically, and somewhat paradoxically, I argue that it could amount to either a reductio of the doomsayers position, or an important and additional reason to join their cause. I use this paradox to suggest that the modal standards for argument in the superintelligence debate need to be addressed. (shrink)

Contrary to common misconceptions, today's logic is not devoid of existential import: the universalized conditional ∀ x [S→ P] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃ x [S & P], not in all cases, but in some. We characterize the proexamples by proving the Existential-Import Equivalence: The antecedent S of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditional has existential import, i.e. whether it implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.A predicate is an open formula having only x free. An existential-import predicate (...) Q is one whose existentialization, ∃ x Q, is logically true; otherwise, Q is existential-import-free or simply import-free.How abundant or widespread is existential import? How abundant or widespread are existential-import predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? We show that existential-import predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential.. (shrink)

Skeptical theism (ST) may undercut the key inference in the evidential argument from evil, but it does so at a cost. If ST is true, then we lose our ability to assess the all things considered (ATC) value of natural events and states of affairs. And if we lose that ability, a whole slew of undesirable consequences follow. So goes a common consequential critique of ST. In a recent article, Anderson has argued that this consequential critique is flawed. Anderson claims (...) that ST only has the consequence that we lack epistemic access to potentially God-justifying reasons for permitting a prima facie “bad” (or “evil”) event. But this is very different from lacking epistemic access to the ATC value of such events. God could have an (unknowable) reason for not intervening to prevent E and yet E could still be (knowably) ATC-bad. Ingenious though it is, this article argues that Anderson’s attempted defence of ST is flawed. This is for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the consequential critique does not rely on the questionable assumption he identifies. Indeed, the argument can be made quite easily by relying purely on Anderson’s distinction between God-justifying reasons for permitting E and the ATC value of E. And second, Anderson’s defence of his position, if correct, would serve to undermine the foundations of ST. (shrink)

In discussions of practical reason we often encounter the view that a fact is a reason for an agent to act only if the fact is capable of moving the agent to act. This view figures centrally in many philosophical controversies, and while taken for granted by some, it is vigorously disputed by others. In this essay I show that if the disputed position is correctly interpreted, it is well armored against stock objections and implied by a premise that is (...) not only plausible, but generally accepted by the position's critics. (shrink)

This chapter treats Hubert Dreyfus’ account of skilled coping as part of his wider project of demonstrating the sovereignty of practical intelligence over all other forms of intelligence. In contrast to the standard picture of human beings as essentially rational, individual agents, Dreyfus argued powerfully on phenomenological and empirical grounds that humans are fundamentally embedded, absorbed, and embodied. These commitments are present throughout Dreyfus’ philosophical writings, from his critique of Artificial Intelligence research in the 1970s and 1980s to his rejection (...) of John McDowell’s conceptualism in his 2005 APA Presidential Address. The present chapter articulates Dreyfus’ proposal for a contentless, non-mentalistic form of intentionality by contrasting his position with that of his U.C. Berkeley colleague John Searle and defending it as a plausible alternative to the so-called “Standard Story” of intentional action as the effect of an agent’s mental states. (shrink)

This paper offers a new account of reflective knowledge’s value, building on recent work on the epistemic norms of speech acts. Reflective knowledge is valuable because it licenses us to make guarantees and promises.

“Second-order Logic” in Anderson, C.A. and Zeleny, M., Eds. Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. 61–76. -/- Abstract. This expository article focuses on the fundamental differences between second- order logic and first-order logic. It is written entirely in ordinary English without logical symbols. It employs second-order propositions and second-order reasoning in a natural way to illustrate the fact that second-order logic is actually a familiar part of our traditional intuitive logical framework and (...) that it is not an artificial formalism created by specialists for technical purposes. To illustrate some of the main relationships between second-order logic and first-order logic, this paper introduces basic logic, a kind of zero-order logic, which is more rudimentary than first-order and which is transcended by first-order in the same way that first-order is transcended by second-order. The heuristic effectiveness and the historical importance of second-order logic are reviewed in the context of the contemporary debate over the legitimacy of second-order logic. Rejection of second-order logic is viewed as radical: an incipient paradigm shift involving radical repudiation of a part of our scientific tradition, a tradition that is defended by classical logicians. But it is also viewed as reactionary: as being analogous to the reactionary repudiation of symbolic logic by supporters of “Aristotelian” traditional logic. But even if “genuine” logic comes to be regarded as excluding second-order reasoning, which seems less likely today than fifty years ago, its effectiveness as a heuristic instrument will remain and its importance for understanding the history of logic and mathematics will not be diminished. Second-order logic may someday be gone, but it will never be forgotten. Technical formalisms have been avoided entirely in an effort to reach a wide audience, but every effort has been made to limit the inevitable sacrifice of rigor. People who do not know second-order logic cannot understand the modern debate over its legitimacy and they are cut-off from the heuristic advantages of second-order logic. And, what may be worse, they are cut-off from an understanding of the history of logic and thus are constrained to have distorted views of the nature of the subject. As Aristotle first said, we do not understand a discipline until we have seen its development. It is a truism that a person's conceptions of what a discipline is and of what it can become are predicated on their conception of what it has been. (shrink)

Bayne and Nagasawa have argued that the properties traditionally attributed to God provide an insufficient grounding for the obligation to worship God. They do so partly because the same properties, when possessed in lesser quantities by human beings, do not give rise to similar obligations. In a recent paper, Jeremy Gwiazda challenges this line of argument. He does so because it neglects the possible existence of a threshold obligation to worship, i.e. an obligation that only kicks in when the value (...) of a parameter has crossed a certain threshold. This article argues that there is a serious flaw in Gwiazda’s proposal. Although thresholds may play an important part in how we think about our obligations, their function is distinct from that envisaged by Gwiazda. To be precise, this article argues that thresholds are only relevant to obligations to the extent that they transform a pre-existing imperfect obligation or act of supererogation into a perfect obligation. Since it is not clear that there is an imperfect obligation to worship any being, and indeed since on a certain conception of moral agency it is highly unlikely that there could be, the search for a rational basis for the obligation to worship must continue. (shrink)

Is sex work (specifically, prostitution) vulnerable to technological unemployment? Several authors have argued that it is. They claim that the advent of sophisticated sexual robots will lead to the displacement of human prostitutes, just as, say, the advent of sophisticated manufacturing robots have displaced many traditional forms of factory labour. But are they right? In this article, I critically assess the argument that has been made in favour of this displacement hypothesis. Although I grant the argument a degree of credibility, (...) I argue that the opposing hypothesis -- that prostitution will be resilient to technological unemployment -- is also worth considering. Indeed, I argue that increasing levels of technological unemployment in other fields may well drive more people into the sex work industry. Furthermore, I argue that no matter which hypothesis you prefer -- displacement or resilience -- you can make a good argument for the necessity of a basic income guarantee, either as an obvious way to correct for the precarity of sex work, or as a way to disincentivise those who may be drawn to prostitution. (shrink)

The five English words—sentence, proposition, judgment, statement, and fact—are central to coherent discussion in logic. However, each is ambiguous in that logicians use each with multiple normal meanings. Several of their meanings are vague in the sense of admitting borderline cases. In the course of displaying and describing the phenomena discussed using these words, this paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyzes several senses of these and related words, focusing on a constellation of recommended senses. One of the purposes of this paper (...) is to demonstrate that ordinary English properly used has the resources for intricate and philosophically sound investigation of rather deep issues in logic and philosophy of language. No mathematical, logical, or linguistic symbols are used. Meanings need to be identified and clarified before being expressed in symbols. We hope to establish that clarity is served by deferring the extensive use of formalized or logically perfect languages until a solid “informal” foundation has been established. Questions of “ontological status”—e.g., whether propositions or sentences, or for that matter characters, numbers, truth-values, or instants, are “real entities”, are “idealizations”, or are “theoretical constructs”—plays no role in this paper. As is suggested by the title, this paper is written to be read aloud. -/- I hope that reading this aloud in groups will unite people in the enjoyment of the humanistic spirit of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn‘t have if it weren‘t the case that P. Dretske develops an (...) analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues that the requirement undermines skepticism by implying the falsity of closure. We develop a Dretske-style analysis of knowing that incorporates CR, and we argue that this analysis not only accords with closure, but also implies it. In addition, we argue that the analysis accounts for the prima facie plausibility of closure-invoking skeptical arguments, and nonetheless implies that they are fallacious. If our arguments turn out to be sound, the acceptability of Dretske‘s analysis of knowing will be significantly enhanced by the fact that, despite implying closure, it undermines closure-based skepticism. (shrink)

The artefacts produced by artists during their creation of works of art are very various: paintings, writings, musical scores, and so on. I have a general thesis to offer about the relations of artefacts and artworks, but within the confines of this article I shall mainly discuss cases drawn from the art of painting, central specimens of which seem to be autographic in Nelson Goodman's sense, namely such that even the most exact duplication of them does not count as producing (...) the same work of art. My view will be that an artwork (such as a painting) and its associated artefact are not identical, and nor is the artefact in any sense part of the painting in question,2 but that nevertheless it is still possible to maintain the view that paintings are autographic (which view I shall call l the autographic thesis). I shall proceed initially through presentation of some counter-examples to common assumptions as to the relations of artefacts and artworks, and then present an alternative 'representational' theory of their relations. (shrink)

This is an encyclopedia article about epistemic closure principles. The article explains what they are, their various philosophical uses, how they are argued for or against, and provides an overview of the related literature.

This accessible essay treats knowledge and belief in a usable and applicable way. Many of its basic ideas have been developed recently in Corcoran-Hamid 2014: Investigating knowledge and opinion. The Road to Universal Logic. Vol. I. Arthur Buchsbaum and Arnold Koslow, Editors. Springer. Pp. 95-126. http://www.springer.com/birkhauser/mathematics/book/978-3-319-10192-7 .